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TERRORISM WITHIN THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT

Rodger A. Bates
Clayton State University

ABSTRACT
Terrorism within the community context investigates and discusses the processes
of terrorist recruitment within communities and societies. It focuses on the
different types of terrorists, their motivations and the social and psychological
factors which are correlated with the transformation of an individual from a
community member to a community threat. This analysis invokes the perspectives
of Durkheim, Sykes and Matza, Snow and others as the role of terrorist is
identified, acquired and acted upon. Particular attention is directed to strategies
and tactics of role acquisition and social support.

Terrorists and terrorism have been a diverse though consistently violent historical
footnote since the earliest days of civilization. A history of terrorism (Poland,
1968: 23-25) takes us from the early Jewish Zealots and the Ismaili Assassins,
through the “Reign of Terror” (French Revolution) and the political and economic
struggles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since World War
Two we have had terrorism as a component of many wars of national liberation,
and today domestic and international terrorism involves a plethora of alphabet
groups such as ETA, PLO, IRA and others and now culminating in the quasipolitical/religious struggles between fundamentalists of various persuasions, such
as Hamas, Al Qaida and a host of other transnational and domestic terrorist
groups.
Terrorism within the community context is a complex phenomenon and
has been investigated from a variety of perspectives. As a complex phenomenon
there have been numerous attempts to identify types of terrorism based upon the
kinds of goals pursued, the types of acts manifested, the motivations for these
acts, the types of people engaged in terrorist behaviors and their social profiles.
Likewise, organizational analyses have dissected group goals, structures,
recruitment, socialization, training and threat-level to a community or society.
However, the primary focus of this inquiry will be the sociological and socialpsychological processes associated with the transformation of an individual from
that of community member to community threat and the development of a number
of sociological types of terrorism. It will bring together the literature on collective
behavior to explain the emergence of a number of types of terrorists.
Terrorism is a social construct (Schmid:1992: 8) that is defined differently
by a variety of constituencies. The State Department, the FBI, the Defense
Department and a host of other agencies and authors have defined terrorism in a
variety of ways White:2009, 3-20). However, for the purposes of this inquiry,
Alex Schmid’s (1992:17) definition which is cited by the United Nations states:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent
action employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group or
state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons,
whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets)
from a target population, and serve as message generators.
Threat- and violence-based communication processes between
terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets
are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it
into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or
propaganda is primarily sought.
http.//unodc.org/undoc/terrorism_definitions.html
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This relatively complex definition, however, does not fully cover the spectrum of
conflict in which popular culture has often applied the term.
Jonathon White (2009:17) presented an interesting typology of terrorism
which involves continuums of the level of activity from low to higher levels of
violence, the relative size of the threat from individual to large-scale group or
organization and finally whether the actions engaged range from criminal to
political in their goals. These continuums allow us to identify different types of
threats and to identify different types of terrorists. This is an initial step in
ascertaining motivation and the processes associated with the transformation of
individuals from community member to community threat.
Common Characteristics:
In all instances of terrorism, a structural environment characterized by a
significant imbalance of power between different ideological groups must exist.
Black (2004:17) noted that terrorism develops when a group with inferior power
mobilizes against a superior power group in a non-normative, violent manner. In
addition, these groups have a strong ideological component: a set of beliefs,
values and norms that justify the existence of the group and can be used to
manipulate and influence the behavior of its members (Rapoport, 1988).
Common to most terrorist movements is an ideology. That is, a set of
interrelated beliefs, values and norms. Ideologies are usually highly abstract and
complex. An ideology is more than a group of rationalizations and myths that
justify the existence of the group; it can be used to manipulate and influence the
behavior of individuals within the group.
In every society, idea, knowledge, lore, superstitions, myths and legends
are shared by its members. These are cultural beliefs. Associated with each belief
are values- the “right” or “wrong” judgments that guide individual actions. This
value code is reinforced through a system of rewards and punishments dispensed
to members within the group. In this way, approved patterns of behavior, or
“norms,” are established and internalized.
Human beings dislike ambiguity and uncertainty in their social,
psychological and physical environments. Through generalized beliefs individuals
seek to give meaning and organization to unexplained events. Common
agreement on certain beliefs also enables individuals to operate collectively
toward a desired goal. Leaders interpret ambiguous situations in terms of the
group’s beliefs or ideology, translating abstract beliefs into specific, concrete
situations in which actions can be taken (Smelser, 1963: 82-84).
Because beliefs and values are only distantly related to concrete action in
daily life, an interpretive process is essential to derive specific rules of behavior.
Commonly agreed upon historical truths are used to justify the norms, values and
beliefs of the revolutionary-terrorist group. Significant events which occurred in
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the past are given symbolic meanings and reinterpretation for the current purpose.
In doing this, a group may select certain concepts and adapt or distort them to
justify specific forms of behavior. Where existing concepts conflict with current
activities, a group may deny that a particular concept is relevant in a particular
case. Selective redefinition is crucial in moving the normative system of a group
from one that is based on generally acceptable social norms to one which is now
based on revolutionary norms that will justify the non-normative and extremist
practices of a terrorist group.
Within any organization, there are reification sources whose role is to
apply new interpretations which now justify significant changes in the social
environment. The Ministry of Truth in Orwell’s 1984, The Mullah’s of Iran, the
former Communist Party theoreticians in Moscow, the Nazi propagandists, the
white supremacists in the Aryan Nation, and Osama Bin Laden are examples of
key individuals who modify the interpretations of their groups ideologies to “fit”
current events are interesting examples of these redefinition specialists.
This process of redefinition is a critical component in the development of
an ideology of moral justification (White, 2009: 34) which underlies the
weakening of the bonds of community and facilitates the process of
transformation from community member to community threat. Hirschi (1969: 634) documents this process in his discussion of control theory by identifying the
factors of attachment, commitment, involvement and belief and their roles in this
process.
In established groups, many beliefs are based upon authority; that is, since
they are voiced by the leaders of the movement, they are accepted as true. When a
leader controls the dissemination of information to the members of an
organization, he censors and approves various types of information. As a result,
the group receives a restricted range of information, and group members tend to
develop a common set of values and beliefs. Thus, in some cases, members need
not be persuaded by argument, induced by reward, compelled by pressure, guided
by past beliefs, or influenced by the opinions of other people; the restricted range
of information to which they have access is sufficient to determine their beliefs
(Turner and Killian, 1987: 347).
Within organizations, certain rules specify desirable behavior and the
consequences of not conforming, and this is extremely critical within
underground or terrorist groups because of security concerns. The rules are
enforced by organized rewards and punishments that are relevant to the objectives
of the group. The inner controls of conscience and normative standards are also
reinforced or enforced by surveillance of members (Hirschi, 1969: 16-34).
Terrorist groups are “normative coercive” organizations. They are
normative in that they appeal to people by offering to satisfy certain goals and to
provide rewards, prestige and esteem. However, coercive power is also applied
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through the threat of deprivation of certain satisfactions or the application of
physical sanctions such as pain or death to insure that complete compliance is
accepted.
Terrorist Types:
Historically, people passively have endured and suffered hardships and
tyranny for many generations, and then outbreaks of revolution, rebellion and
terrorism have erupted in one segment of society while others continue to tolerate
their oppression. Discerning the causes and correlates of violent, non-normative
movements have been of concern and interest to sociological inquiry since the
advent of the discipline.
Terrorists can be differentiated in terms of their goals and objectives, and
thus we can initiate our analysis of their motivational characteristics. The U.S.
Army (2007: 2-15), for example, describes terrorist groups as separatist,
ethnocentric, nationalistic, and revolutionary. Each of these categories reflects
different motivational characteristics which influence the processes of recruitment
and membership.
Eric Hoffer (1951: 23) suggested that “the game of history is usually
played by the best and the worst over the heads of the majority in the middle.”
Historically, researchers and writers have suggested that it is frequently from the
ranks of the undesirable that the memberships of revolutionary and terrorist
movements are recruited (Hagopian, 1974).
The reason that the less successful elements of a society can exert a
marked influence on the revolutionary or terrorist process is that they are largely
without reverence toward the present. They see their lives and present as spoiled
beyond remedy and they are ready to waste and wreck both; hence their
recklessness and their will to chaos and anarchy. As Marx noted, “…they have
nothing to lose but their chains” (Tucker,1978: 292). Likewise, they may also
crave to dissolve their spoiled, meaningless existence in some soul-stirring,
spectacular communal undertaking or crusade. To replace anomie with
commitment, they are often early recruits of revolutions, mass migrations,
religious, racial or terrorist movements. Thus the discarded and rejected are often
the raw material of a movement’s future. The stone the builder rejects becomes
the cornerstone of a new order.
However, the terrorists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries may still seek to replace anomie with commitment, but they are
increasingly from a broader, more privileged background. Researchers have noted
that today’s terrorists are not initially psychopaths (Stahelski:1)). In fact, they
seem to be from a variety of different family backgrounds and with different
personality characteristics. Walter Laqueur (1999: 243) suggests that it is not
possible to develop a composite picture of a terrorist because as terrorism
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changes, over time, it attracts different constituencies and practitioners. For
example, the terrorists associated with the ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna)
movement in the Basque region in Spain appear quite different in membership
and motivation than do the Chechen Black Widows or the 9/11 terrorists of Al
Qaeda.
Durkheim, in his early study of suicide, noted that there was a relationship
between this form deviant behavior and a society’s or group’s normative order
(Timascheff, 1966). His identification of anomic, egoistic and altruistic suicide
(p.111) suggests that the collective forces of social life may provide some insight
into the process of becoming a terrorist within the community context.
Specifically, an environment of anomie or normlessness provides a fertile context
for the recruitment of individuals to a cause, cult or even a terrorist group. Hoffer
(1951) notes this in his True Believer. Likewise, Turner and Killian (1987: 325346) and others in the field of collective behavior provide significant
documentation of the strategies and tactics of many groups who actively seek
members from individuals in highly anomic situations and circumstances. Anomic
terrorists are joiners, seeking identity and membership in a cause. Group
membership such as in a terrorist movements, serves to satisfy several types of
individual needs. It satisfies the need to belong, and offers recognition and
prestige. The member’s status is enhanced and self-esteem is raised. A strong
terrorist organization gives opportunities to gain economic, political, religious
and/or status goals which could not otherwise be obtained.
Most terrorists appear to come from some environment of anomie. It may
vary from absolute to relative deprivation. It must, however, be sufficient to
overcome the control of the normative order to allow them to consider the very
risk-filled process of being transformed from a community member to a
community threat.
Obviously, from the context of anomie or a breakdown in social norms in
a society or community undergoing rapid social change, one potential type of
terrorist is the nationalist, revolutionary or insurgent terrorist. The anomic
insurgent terrorist is an individual who becomes an involved member of an
underground group and terrorism becomes a tactical tool of confrontation. This
type of terrorist is usually a guerrilla fighter who undergoes a relatively intensive
transformation process that replaces his sense of alienation or estrangement from
the community with one of membership and commitment to the underground
group of a transitional movement.
A second type of terrorist is somewhat consistent with the individual who
experiences a breakdown of social ties. In an environment of weak group
integration, the individual’s sense of self may be enhanced to the extent that he
considers himself above the constraints of the community (Timascheff: 111). In
this instance, the self-centered person may become the egoistic lone-wolf
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terrorist. Lone-wolf terrorists may be from a variety of backgrounds, but they
tend to be cognizant of extremist literature, books and web-sites (Artiga:2010:1).
They tend to be anti-social. Ted Kaczynski (Uni-Bomber), Timothy McVeigh
(Oklahoma City Bomber), and both the Christmas Day and Ft. Hood terrorists
were socially isolated individuals who identified with an agenda, but not an
organization. They felt either individually “called” or uniquely capable of not
only confronting the community, but also of succeeding because of their belief in
their self-superiority.
A third type of terrorist is consistent with Durkheim’s identification of a
normative environment within which an individual identifies in an overly
committed manner (Timascheff: 111). In this context, a value orientation is so
strongly held that it overcomes most traditional normative restraints against
violence against others and oneself. The altruistic suicide terrorist is an individual
who engages in non-normative violent acts against a community and its members
because of his/her strong commitment to an ideology or belief system which
antithetical to that of the society or community. Examples of altruistic terrorism
include the suicide terrorists of Al Qaeda and Hamas.
An interesting sub-set of the altruistic suicide terrorist would be the
fatalistic suicide terrorist. Durkheim alluded to a fourth type of suicide in his
writings. Similarly, Holmes and Holmes (2005: 31) point out that a combination
of acute internalization of a belief system and a condition of desperation and/or
hopelessness can contribute to self-destruction and the creation of a fatalistic
suicide terrorist. In a last act of defiance, as in the case of the Chechen female
suicide bombers or “Black Widows,” White ( 2009: 341) notes that women who
had been ravaged by Russian troops and who had lost their husbands and children
were used as suicide bombers in both in Chechnya and in Moscow. They had lost
all status and social ties and with no hope for the future, revenge was their last
option of opposition.
Drawing heavily on Durkheim’s role of the normative order, the anomic
insurgent terrorist, the egoistic lone-wolf terrorist, the altruistic/fatalistic suicide
terrorist represent a sociological perspective of terrorist types. The examples cited
reflect a social or cultural environment conducive to the transformation of a
community member into a community threat.
The Process of Terrorism:
Students of terrorism have identified the transformation process from
community member to community threat as similar to that of the processes
associated with cult membership and behavior (Stahelski: 2). Obviously, terrorist
recruitment is risky business. Overcoming the normative constraints against
violence is a difficult and challenging task. David Snow (1979:23-44) notes that
cults, movements, and in this instance terrorists groups, often build idiosyncrasy
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credit as a tactic to render itself more attractive and acceptable. The Taliban,
Hamas and even the Black Panthers have done “good works” as a movementrelated resource which facilitates acceptance of their more controversial tactics.
The “techniques of neutralization” introduced by Sykes and Matza (1957: 664670) seems to address this process. The techniques of denial of responsibility,
denial of injury, denial of a victim, condemnation of the condemmer, and appeals
to higher loyalties have been used to weaken the power of the general norms of
society and provide a means for making the unacceptable, acceptable. Thus, the
process of moral justification of terrorism is established (White:2009:34).
However, it is in the balance between recruitment and organizational
security that the transformation process becomes a dangerous environment. First,
the types of people recruited into an underground or terrorist organization depend
largely on the group’s stage of development. The context of control by the larger
society shapes the strategies, opportunities and risks of recruitment (Turner and
Killian, 1987: 11-14).
Initially, terrorist groups seek to identify and attract talented individuals
with grievances against the status-quo, the community or the state and to
surreptitiously test each individual’s loyalty to the movement. Then, through a
process of gradual commitment potential recruits are channeled through a process
of gradual commitment into the terrorist group. Effective “pitches” are tailored to
each recruit based upon the cultural, social and historical context of the movement
(Gerwehr and Daly, 2006: 74).
Joining a terrorist organization is quite different from joining an ordinary
political group. One ex-communist says that it is not like joining a political party,
but like joining a church. The literature in collective behavior on cults, sects, and
other non-normative groups provide many insights in the more extreme contexts
of terrorist organizations. Another former terrorist says:
A faith is not acquired by reasoning. One does not fall in love
with a woman, or enter the womb of a church, as the result of
logical persuasion. Reason may defend an act of faith – but
only after the act has been committed, and the man committed
to the act. Persuasion may play a part in a man’s conversion;
but only the part of bringing to it a conscious climax of the
process in which there has been maturing in regions where no
persuasion can penetrate. (Koestler, 1949:15)

The act of commitment in terrorist or other clandestine organizations is
uniformly an oath-taking process. The individual performs some symbolic, overt
act which demonstrates his willingness to accept the rules of the organization and
abide by its sanctions if he does not conform. Once committed, the individual
reorganizes his frame of reference and the way he views the world to conform to
his new commitments.
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During this transformation process, organizational security is critical for
the protection of the terrorist group. Therefore, the potential terrorist recruit is
initially only allowed limited access to the workings and identity of the members
of the group. It is only after a series of tests and acts of increasing commitment
that a terrorist gains access to group membership. This is critical for the insurgent
terrorist, but not as crucial for the lone-wolf type of terrorist who, through the
processes of “differential identification,” accepts an ideology or a cause without
actual association or involvement (Glaser, 1956).
The essence of the process of transformation from community member to
community threat involves a series of social-psychological conditioning phases
which initially “eliminates an individual’s old social and personal identities and
then reconditions joiners to hate and sometimes kill noncombatants upon
demand” (Stahelski, 2004: 2). These phases include: Phase I - Depluralization
during which a stripping away all other of the individual’s group identities; Phase
II – Self-deindividuation which involves removing each member’s personal
identity; Phase III – Other-deindividuation where the personal identities of the
enemies are removed or neutralized; Phase IV – Dehumanization through which
enemies are identified as sub-human, non-human; and Phase 5 – Demonization
through which the enemy is identified as evil. These stages of psychological
conditioning are constantly reinforced through both formal and informal group
pressures and the reification of the movement through the rhetoric of charismatic
or highly revered leaders.
Although an individual may be persuaded, coerced, tricked or forced to
join a terrorist movement, his goals and desires may change as he stays with the
organization. Recruitment is only the initial phase of involvement. Indoctrination
brings about the socialization of the individual, and his experiences in
participation with members of the movement change his attitude and eventually
his goals.
During the indoctrination period, the aim is to have the individual
internalize the values of the organization. Total control is achieved through
insulation and absorption. Through ideology the individual is insulated and given
a separate moral and intellectual world within which to think and operate; all
events are interpreted within the context of ideology. The conspiratorial
atmosphere, with an emphasis on illegal work, starts a process of disintegration of
normal moral principles and a reduction of inhibitions which hampers an
individual’s actions and ability to be manipulated. All of his time is absorbed by
organizational activities – meetings, demonstrations, distribution of literature and
recruitment. This constant activity gives the individual’s life an apparent meaning
and removes him from outside interests and contacts (Stahelski, 2004: 4).
Indoctrination and education reinforce an individual’s loyalty to the
underground terrorist organization and immersion in the movement. The
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individual is disciplined and schooled to think in terms of how his actions can
help or hinder the organization, not how they fit his former personal goals or
norms.
When an individual joins an organization, the number of decisions and
alternatives available to him decreases; he devotes most of his time to
organizational activities and therefore limits his outside interests. As an individual
reduces the number of personal relationships, he tends to internalize the rules of
the organization and to search less for alternative forms of behavior. Small,
closely knit cohesive groups, like most terrorist cells, are highly predictable in
behavior. This rigidity increases the extent to which the group goals are perceived
to be shared by all members of the group. It is through this development of “esprit
de corps” that terrorist groups protect themselves from outside pressures.
The internalization process is complete when group members maintain
their conduct without such enforcing agents as surveillance or the direct threat of
punishment and when they perform their duties for their own sake. Rousseau
(1762) noted the importance of internalized control when he stated that “The
strongest, unless he transforms force into right and obedience into duty is never
strong enough to have his way all the time”. This awareness of the role of
internalization was more formally expressed in sociology by Hirschi (1969) in his
articulation of control theory.
As the individual builds up institutional habits and internalizes a code of
conduct, he is less likely to leave or inform on his fellow terrorists. The smaller
the group, the greater the individual’s involvement and commitment to the group
(LaPierre, 1954: 212). Likewise, the more extensive one’s participation in group
activities, the more likely the individual is to develop loyalty and moral
involvement and finally a commitment to the general goals of the terrorist group.
The greater the prestige and status of a terrorist group within a given
social context, the more demanding it can be in its recruitment and indoctrination
processes. In some cases, potential recruits may be willing to participate in
extreme acts to gain membership. In other instances, the group may need to
introduce members more slowly into the context of terrorism and allow them to
develop a valued identity prior to requiring extreme, non-normative acts of
aggression and violence.
The leader’s authority and reputation is often sufficient to maintain social
control. Persuasion may be used to present a particular judgment in such a way
that the individual members see the value of accepting it in place of their own
judgment. Because of the clandestine nature of the terrorist group, conformity to
the directions and judgments of one’s superiors is expected. Because of security
reasons, little deviation from the group’s norms or the leader’s directions is
expected or tolerated. In this environment, a loss of group status is frequently
accompanied by a loss of life.
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The Process of Retention:
Once terrorists have been recruited and indoctrinated, sustaining loyalty
becomes a significant priority. In the case of the altruistic/fatalistic suicide
terrorist, sustaining commitment over a long period is usually not required as they
are usually expended relatively quickly. The egoistic lone-wolf terrorist, on the
other hand, usually operates independently from any group or organization.
Sometimes, as was often the case with ETA terrorists in the Basque separatist
movement, they dropped in and out of the movement over a period of time and
many ceased their operations as they aged or social conditions changed (White,
2009: 332). However, the anomic insurgent terrorist, being in the movement for
the long-haul, must adapt and be sustained as an on-going member of the
movement.
Frequent assignments and a high degree of activity also have a useful side
effect of providing the individual with a sense of invulnerability (U.S. Army,
2007: 2-15). He becomes so engrossed in his work that he loses any fear of harm
coming to him. While he may be aware that others have been caught or killed, he
is so busy with his daily routine that he unconsciously considers himself
invulnerable. This feeling is further enhanced by progressively increasing the
danger of failure or compromise in the early stages of his training and
indoctrination. For example, throwing a few stones in a riot or anonymously
distributing literature or painting a few slogans in the night can set the stage for
more direct and even dangerous confrontations later on.
Psychological methods and morale-maintaining techniques have been used
to induce loyalty and to sustain the role of terrorists. Since defections often occur
after serious losses, many terrorist groups establish elaborate strategies to
preserve morale and membership. For example, great care is given to make sure
that bodies of those killed in action are safeguarded and ceremonies of recognition
and honor are conducted, whenever possible (Scaff, 1955:121). This type of
experience supports group solidarity and is used to motivate others to avenge the
loss of their comrades, to establish a standard of sacrifice or to provide
recognition and honor for those who fall in the cause. Hamas, Hezbollah and
other jihadist groups also provide pensions and support to the families of suicide
bombers or others who have been killed within the context of their movements.
This increases retention and participation by providing an additional source of
group support and recognition for active terrorists.
Terrorist group membership is also sustained through the use of more
formal controls. New recruits are usually not initially given tasks of great
responsibility and are kept under close surveillance. They are usually not allowed
to leave the group without supervision. Most terrorist groups require that new
recruits take an oath promising to remain with the movement on penalty of death.
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Terror or enforcing squads are used to retaliate against defectors. Atrocity stories
about how defectors are treated by the enemy are frequently part of a new
member’s orientation and indoctrination into a movement.
Fishman (2006: 34-35) notes that the lifestyle of a terrorist may provide
emotional, physical and sometimes social rewards that had not previously been
available to an individual. Emotional rewards such as feelings of notoriety, power
and belonging may be attractive to some. In some situations, a sense of
satisfaction in rebellion or defying a hated power group may be rewarding; in
other circumstances, participation may be perceived as an increase in social status
or even power. Especially in the case of the anomic insurgent terrorist, the intense
sense of belonging generated by membership in an illegal group may be
emotionally satisfying.
Thus, the motives for remaining within terrorist movements may be quite
different from those of joining. Indoctrination and propaganda expose the
individual to new ideas, of which he may have been unaware before initial
membership. New friends, as well as immersion into organizational
responsibilities, are strong supports for continued organizational membership.
Terrorists are also influenced by the emergent norms of the group. Turner
and Killian (1987: 7-10) stressed the role of norm development as an intrinsic
stage in the process of collective behavior. In terrorist groups, norms of violence
and commitment are developed in the peer group environment of a subversive
organization. Though ideology may play a part in the initial attraction to the
group, it is peer group pressure which emerges as the true tie that binds the
member to the organization. Membership is further perpetuated through moralesustaining techniques and practices of the group. Various psychological
techniques, such as special ceremonies, group discussions and recognition by
revered leaders, either directly or indirectly reinforce the norm of committed
membership. Finally, simple inertia and habit of involvement may be another
impediment against any inclination to leave a terrorist group.
As previously noted by Hirschi (1969: 16-24), the power of the internal
controls of conscience are also reinforced through the group’s surveillance and
threats of retaliation against those who either reduce their active commitment or
consider defection. Thus, an individual conforms to group norms for many
reasons. He may conform out of habit, he may anticipate group administered
rewards, such as promotion or group approval, or he may be directed through the
use of group disapproval or sanctions. Psychological sanctions depend for their
effectiveness on the value the individual places on his status within the group.
While a great loss of status seldom results from a single act, serious or persistent
deviations may lead to loss of status, one’s reputation as a trusted member, or
even one’s life within the terrorist movement (Crozier,1960: 170).
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Summary and Conclusions:
“Terrorism Within the Community Context” investigates and discusses the
processes of terrorist recruitment within communities and societies and the
development of the anomic insurgent terrorist, the egoistic lone-wolf terrorist,
and the altruistic/fatalistic suicide terrorist Building upon the rich literature in the
fields of collective behavior and social movements, this presentation focused on
the different types of terrorists, their motivations and the social and psychological
factors which are correlated with the transformation of an individual from a
community member to a community threat. This analysis invoked the
perspectives of Durkheim, Sykes and Matza, Snow, Hirschi and others as the role
of terrorist is identified, acquired and acted upon. Particular attention was directed
to strategies and tactics of role acquisition and social support.
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